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POLICE CULTURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  
A CRITIQUE OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE’S 
FINAL REPORT 
Julian A. Cook, III∗ 
[A] lot of our work is going to involve local police chiefs, local 
elected officials, states recognizing that the moment is now for us 
to make these changes.  We have a great opportunity, coming out 
of some great conflict and tragedy, to really transform how we 
think about community law enforcement relations so that 
everybody feels safer and our law enforcement officers feel, rather 
than being embattled, feel fully supported. 
—President Barack Obama1 
 
In response to a series of events involving police-citizen encounters, 
including those in Ferguson, Missouri, and Staten Island, New York, that 
have strained relations between law enforcement and the communities 
(primarily minority) that they serve, President Barack Obama established a 
task force charged with developing a set of recommendations designed to 
improve police practices and enhance public trust.2  Headed by Charles 
Ramsey, Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, and Laurie 
Robinson, former Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Justice Programs, and currently a Professor of 
Criminology, Law, and Society at George Mason University,3 the eleven-
member task force submitted its documented recommendations in May 
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 ∗  J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  A.B., 
Duke University; M.P.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law. 
 1  Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President After Meeting with 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/02/remarks-president-after-meeting-task-force-21st-century-policing. 
 2  Exec. Order No. 13,684, 3 C.F.R. 312 (2014). 
 3  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 81 (2015) [hereinafter Report]. 
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2015.  In a report entitled the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing (the Report), the task force sets forth in excess of 
sixty recommendations, which address, among other things: building 
community trust, police policies, employment of technologies, officer 
training, and officer wellness and safety.4 
The Report suggests that effective policing and improved community 
relations can be achieved through redirected police policies, enhanced 
communication with—and involvement of—local communities in public 
safety matters, as well as improved and sensitized law enforcement 
training.5  Rather than engage in a comprehensive examination of the 
Report’s proposals, this Essay will address an important theme highlighted 
by the task force—the importance of reforming police culture—and explain 
why the well-intentioned recommendations proffered in the report 
associated with addressing cultural change will face substantial hurdles to 
successful implementation. 
I.     REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Report correctly identifies police culture as a principal underlying 
cause for the strained relations existent between the police and many local 
communities.  It observes that while police investigative practices have 
become increasingly effective, the public’s confidence in the police has 
either “remained flat” or, particularly in minority communities, has 
declined.6  Recognizing that obedience to the law increases when a 
 
 4  Id. at i. 
 5  See id. at 1–4.  The Report has also generated criticism.  E.g., Stephen Dinan & 
Ben Wolfgang, Obama Seeks to End Immigration Enforcement by Local, State Police, 
WASHINGTON TIMES (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/18/obama-seeks-to-end-immigration-
enforcement-by-loca/?page=all (arguing that the Report’s recommendation that the federal 
government “decouple” itself from state and local law enforcement authorities in 
immigration enforcement is misplaced); Stuart Schrader, The Liberal Solution to Police 
Violence: Restoring Trust Will Ensure More Obedience, THE INDYPENDENT (June 30, 2015) 
https://indypendent.org/2015/06/30/liberal-solution-police-violence-restoring-trust-will-
ensure-more-obedience (arguing that the Report’s recommendations will ultimately enhance 
police powers, and that it pays too little attention to the disparity among white and minority 
communities regarding perceptions of police legitimacy); Alex S. Vitale, Obama’s Police 
Reforms Ignore the Most Important Cause of Police Misconduct, THE NATION (Mar. 6, 
2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/obamas-police-reforms-ignore-most-important-
cause-police-misconduct/ (arguing that that the task force paid insufficient attention to 
structural realities which work to maintain racial inequality and failed to recommend a 
redirection from alleged harmful police priorities, such as the war on drugs and “broken 
windows” police practices). 
 6  Report, supra note 3, at 9. 
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community supports the legitimacy of those employed to enforce it,7 the 
Report identifies four procedural prerequisites to achieving this objective: 
(1) extending dignity and respect to individuals; (2) allowing individuals 
the opportunity to express themselves during encounters; (3) decision 
making that is fair and transparent; and (4) conveying motives that the 
public deems to be “trustworthy.”8 
To this end, the Report proffers several recommendations designed to 
improve the culture of policing.  The recommendations, which are 
distributed throughout the ninety-nine page report and are contained in five 
of the six principal topical areas (or “pillars”) identified in the document, 
focus overwhelmingly upon police practices and procedures.  For example, 
the task force suggests that law enforcement “embrace a guardian mindset 
to build public trust and legitimacy,” and that it adopt internal and external 
procedural polices consistent with this approach.9  The Report also 
recommends that police departments become more transparent with respect 
to their policies, as well as their data reflecting detentions, arrests, and 
other demographic information.10  It further suggests that law enforcement 
agencies develop policies regarding the employment of force that are “clear 
[and] concise,” that are available for public review,11 and that emphasize 
the exercise of restraint in appropriate circumstances.12 
The Report also urges the adoption of community policing policies, 
which emphasize positive, collaborative relationships between the police 
and various community members and groups.13  It states that the 
“infus[ion]” of a community policing approach “throughout the culture and 
organizational structure of law enforcement agencies” would help 
“transform culture within the police department as well as in the 
community.”14  Significant emphasis is also placed upon training and 
education, which the Report declares is the “starting point for changing the 
culture of policing.”15  Finally, the Report delineates an array of measures 
that it suggests would promote officer wellness and safety.  Referencing 
testimony by Dr. Alexander Eastman during one of the seven “listening 
sessions” sponsored by the task force, the Report notes that the 
 
 7  Id. at 9–10. 
 8  Id. at 10. 
 9  Id. at 11 (Recommendation 1.1). 
 10  Id. at 13 (Action Item 1.3.1).  
 11  Id. at 20 (Recommendation 2.2). 
 12  Id. at 20–21. 
 13  Id. at 41–42. 
 14  Id. at 43 (Recommendation 4.2).  
 15  Id. at 53 (Recommendation 5.1).  The task force recommends a more active federal 
involvement in local and state training initiatives.  Id. at 53–60. 
2016] P O L I C E  C U L T U R E  I N  T H E  T W E N T Y - F I R S T  C E N T U R Y  109 
transformation of police organizational culture is “the most important 
factor to consider when discussing [officer] wellness and safety.”16 
Individually and collectively, the proffered police organizational 
reforms are laudable objectives.  Embracing a guardian mindset, increasing 
law enforcement policy and practice transparency, adopting community 
policing practices, and improving officer training and education are 
reasoned approaches to the issue of police malfeasance.  The problem, 
however, has less to do with the proffered recommendations than with the 
incentives on the part of the police to pursue such goals and to retain any 
successes that are achieved.  Without more, successful implementation and 
permanence of the proffered recommendations are dependent, in large part, 
upon the initiative and good faith of law enforcement entities across the 
country.  Some departments with problematic cultures might refuse to 
implement corrective measures.  Others might take corrective action with 
vigor.  Yet, even the most willing actor must have sufficient motivation to 
maintain its successes. 
II.     SUPREME COURT INFLUENCES 
Unfortunately, there exists a heavy wave of influences that run counter 
to successful organizational reforms.  Chief among them are the steady and 
powerful signals that have been consistently delivered to law enforcement 
agencies from the Supreme Court since the close of the Warren Court era in 
1969.  The Warren Court was characterized, in large part, by its 
comparatively liberal construction of individual constitutional safeguards.  
It was during this period that the Court rendered the historic Miranda v. 
Arizona decision, which afforded individuals in police custody the right to 
be informed of their rights to counsel and to remain silent prior to the 
commencement of interrogation,17 that the right to counsel was extended to 
individuals charged with felonies18 and to certain forms of out-of-court 
identification procedures,19 and that a privacy safeguard was recognized in 
telephonic conversations that occur outside the home.20 
And it was the Warren Court that decided Mapp v. Ohio,21 the 
landmark case which extended the reach of the exclusionary rule to the 
states.  In general terms, the exclusionary rule provides that, in the event of 
a Fourth Amendment breach, the derivative evidence cannot be used at 
trial.  In language that was forceful and clear, the Court found that the rule 
 
 16  Id. at 62. 
 17  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 18  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 19  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 20  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 21  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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of exclusion was a constitutional mandate.22  It unequivocally considered 
the exclusionary component an “essential part of the right to privacy.”23  A 
different interpretation, the Court explained, would render the safeguards 
against unreasonable searches and seizures a guarantee in word only.24  The 
Court reasoned that it was “logically and constitutionally necessary” to 
extend this mandate to the states in order to give substance to the 
constitutional guarantees, to incentivize the government to respect these 
safeguards, and to prevent prosecutorial forum shopping.25  Yet, during the 
post–Warren Court era the Court has steadily, and significantly, departed 
from Mapp.   
No longer considered part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment, the 
rule of exclusion is now viewed by a majority of the Court as a remedy of 
“last resort.”26  It is a remedy that is applied only when appreciable 
deterrence to purposeful, reckless, or grossly negligent police misconduct 
can be achieved.27  Though the exclusionary rule as a principle remains 
intact, various exceptions to the rule have developed which together have 
significantly circumscribed the circumstances under which a claimant can 
avail himself of exclusion.28  Unquestionably, the most notable exception 
has been the “good faith” rule, which has operated to exclude Fourth 
Amendment violations in instances where the police have acted in good 
faith reliance upon their authorization to conduct a search.29  By any 
measure, the exclusionary rule is now a shell of its former self. 
In addition, the landscape of individuals eligible to pursue 
constitutional challenges to police conduct has narrowed significantly since 
the Warren Court.  Consider that in 1960, the Supreme Court in Jones v. 
 
 22  Id. at 655 (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 23  Id. at 656. 
 24  Id. at 655. 
 25  Id. at 655–58. 
 26  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 
547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).  
 27  Id. at 144. 
 28  See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (the independent source 
doctrine); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (the inevitable discovery doctrine); Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (the attenuated circumstances doctrine).  
 29  E.g. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (officer reasonably relied on a “negligent 
bookkeeping error by another police employee”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) 
(officer reasonably relied on court clerk’s determination, later found to be erroneous, that 
the defendant had an outstanding warrant for arrest); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) 
(in conducting a warrantless administrative search, officer reasonably relied upon a state 
statute later found to be unconstitutional); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 
(officer reasonably relied upon a search warrant later found to be lacking in probable cause). 
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United States30 identified four possible bases upon which standing to 
pursue a constitutional challenge could be established: (1) legitimate 
presence on the premises of a search; (2) establishment of a privacy 
interest; (3) a possessory interest in the evidence searched or seized; or (4) 
being a target of a government search.31  Of the four, only the privacy test 
remains, and it represents the predominant standard through which standing 
can be established.32  The privacy test threshold requires an infringement 
upon a claimant’s personal Fourth Amendment protections and does not 
recognize the assertion of third-party claims.33   
The Court’s diminishment of the right of exclusion and its meaningful 
narrowing of the class of eligible claimants conveys a powerful signal to 
law enforcement—not to mention society in general—that the 
constitutional misdeeds of the police will frequently be overlooked.  
Simultaneously, the Court conveys that individual constitutional safeguards 
are not fully guaranteed.  As a result, police organizations become 
emboldened by their expanded investigative latitude, and an aggressive 
culture of policing is often an accompanying byproduct.  No doubt, police 
work is dangerous, unpredictable, reactive, and riddled with risks.34  A 
seemingly innocent encounter can become violent or even deadly with little 
or no notice.  Yet police practices that are overly aggressive can fragment a 
police-community relationship and destroy the trust necessary for an 
effectual coexistence. 
How to tame aggressive and unconstitutional police practices within 
the context of effective policing is the ultimate question.  It is, however, 
unrealistic to expect meaningful and sustained cultural change absent 
sufficient incentives.  The reforms detailed in the Report are directed 
primarily at police organizations and are dependent upon the initiatives of 
state and local agencies.  But goodwill alone will produce little 
measureable benefit unless accompanied by legislative or judicial mandates 
 
 30  362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
 31  See id. at 261, 263–67. 
 32  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).  Rakas is part of a series of cases in which 
the Court substantially narrowed the range of individuals capable of pursuing constitutional 
challenges.  See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1980) (finding that “a 
prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the seized 
good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal 
contradiction”); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (despite owning the narcotics 
discovered during a search by law enforcement officers, defendant lacked standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of that search); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 
(1980) (stating that the Court’s precedents “do not command the exclusion of evidence in 
every case of illegality [by law enforcement officials]”). 
 33  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137–38. 
 34  See Report, supra note 3, at 61–62 (describing the “physical, mental, and emotional 
injuries [that] plague many law enforcement agencies”). 
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that penalize police misdeeds.  The police are not going to relinquish 
investigative authority granted by the Supreme Court through voluntary 
election. 
Indeed, a few proffered reforms recommend that the police ignore 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent.  One such proposal suggests that 
“[l]aw enforcement officers should be required to seek consent before a 
search and explain that a person has the right to refuse consent when there 
is no warrant or probable cause.”35  But in 1973, the Supreme Court in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte36 held “that knowledge of a right to refuse is not 
a prerequisite of a voluntary consent.”37  And another proposal 
recommends that “[l]aw enforcement agencies and municipalities . . . 
refrain from . . . initiat[ing] investigative contacts with citizens for reasons 
not directly related to improving public safety, such as generating 
revenue.”38  Yet the Supreme Court has plainly granted law enforcement 
plenary authority to approach and follow individuals irrespective of the 
officer’s underlying motivation, and this unrestrained freedom exists up 
until the moment that a seizure occurs within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.39 
The answer to the problem of twenty-first century policing is no doubt 
complex.  There is no silver-bullet answer.  But the ultimate solution must 
include a reversal of much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 
exclusionary rule context.  The diminishment of the right to exclusion has 
helped foster the problem of aggressive policing, and a reinvigoration of 
this principle would help reverse this trend.  And the natural place to start is 
by expanding the base of individuals eligible to challenge unconstitutional 
police practices.  A meaningful expansion of this base, in particular the 
allowance of third-party standing, will not only allow for more widespread 
challenges to unconstitutional and aggressive police behaviors, but also 
incentivize police organizations to adapt to this new environment.  An 
expanded landscape of challengers to their practices will motivate police 
organizations to alter their culture and engage in more constitutionally 
compliant behaviors.  Persistent challenges to police organization practices, 
coupled with strictly enforced exclusionary rules, are among the big sticks 
that can help effectuate the changes sought in the Report. 
 
 35  Report, supra note 3, at 27 (Recommendation 2.10). 
 36  412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 37  Id. at 234. 
 38  Report, supra note 3, at 26 (Recommendation 2.9). 
 39  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (plurality opinion) (first citing 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n.12 (1979); then citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 31, 32–33 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring); and then citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., 
concurring)). 
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Notably, third-party standing is currently authorized in the criminal 
sphere in the context of jury selection.  The Supreme Court in Batson v. 
Kentucky40 held that a prosecutor violated the equal protection rights of a 
black defendant when he exercised his peremptory challenges to exclude 
potential black jurors.41  But it was the Court’s decision in Powers v. 
Ohio42 that allowed for third-party enforcement of the Batson principle.  In 
Powers, the Court held that a white defendant had third-party standing to 
assert the equal protection rights of the jurors who were wrongly excluded 
during jury selection.43  In reaching this result, the Court reasoned, inter 
alia, that the defendant would be sufficiently motivated to pursue the equal 
protection rights of the excluded members of the venire, and that the latter 
group would be insufficiently motivated to seek legal redress.44 
The same rationales apply with equal force in the Fourth Amendment 
context.  Defendants are aggrieved by unconstitutional police behaviors 
when evidence obtained as a byproduct of such actions is introduced 
against them at trial.  Whether obtained in violation of their personal 
privacy protections or those of someone else, the injury and the motivation 
to seek vindication of the constitutional infringement is quite significant.  
When confronted with the prospect of a criminal conviction and possible 
incarceration, defendants become highly motivated actors to exclude 
evidence that can produce such undesirable outcomes.  For the criminal 
defendant, it is immaterial whether the Fourth Amendment protections that 
have been violated belong to the defendant or a third-party.  The impetus to 
exclude remains the same. 
And like the wrongly stricken juror, the uncharged individual 
victimized by unconstitutional police behavior is highly unlikely to pursue 
a legal remedy.  Structural barriers, such as qualified immunity, which 
largely shields law enforcement personnel from individual liability,45 and 
the Eleventh Amendment, which protects the states against civil damages 
actions,46 serve as meaningful disincentives to the pursuit of legal redress.  
In addition, there are practical barriers.  Distrust of the legal system, 
particularly in minority communities, and access to lawyers willing to 
 
 40  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 41  Id. at 89. 
 42  499 U.S. 400 (1991).   
 43  Id. at 409. 
 44  Id. at 411, 414–15. 
 45  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (officers receive qualified 
immunity for their actions so long as they do not violate clearly established laws or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware). 
 46  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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assume a civil action against the police are notable impediments.47  
Furthermore, individuals aggrieved by unconstitutional government 
conduct are less likely than the juror populations at issue in the Powers line 
of cases to pursue legal action on account of financial hardships, childcare 
difficulties, and misgivings regarding the fairness of the criminal judicial 
process.48 
CONCLUSION 
The spate of disturbing police-citizen contacts that have recently 
generated significant media attention has prompted renewed attention upon 
the propriety of police practices, particularly in minority communities.  The 
comprehensive reforms set forth in the Report certainly provide a useful 
platform from which this discussion can take place.  Yet meaningful reform 
is dependent less upon the establishment of task forces, the development of 
innovative ideas, and the art of persuasive argumentation than upon 
legislative and judicial dictates that mandate change.  The Supreme Court’s 
steady and significant diminishment of individual safeguards since the 
close of the Warren Court era—including the exclusionary rule and the 
related concept of standing—has contributed to a police organizational 
culture that has manifested itself in aggressive and unconstitutional 
behaviors that have seemingly become more pronounced in recent years.  
However, a robust exclusionary rule, coupled with a vastly expanded 
landscape of eligible challengers to police practices, can help effectuate a 
beneficial change in police culture and officer behavior on the ground.  It is 
this sort of change—meaningful access to the enforcement arm of the 
judiciary, and the court’s liberal authority to wield that influence—that are 
necessary prerequisites to consequential reform.  And until these 
prerequisites are satisfied, I submit that it is doubtful that transformative 
change in police culture will occur. 
 
 47  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS, 69–70 (2012) (arguing, inter alia, that many individuals—minorities in 
particular—who are victimized by police misconduct are unlikely to pursue legal action out 
of fear of police harassment and retaliation and distrust of the legal process). 
 48  Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through 
Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (1999) (noting that jury 
populations tend to underrepresent minority groups and that the community of non-jurors is, 
inter alia, more likely than juror populations to have financial resource and child care 
difficulties, English proficiency issues, and apathy toward the judicial process). 
